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S.: Insurance--Retention of Premiums After Loss--Non-Existence of Per
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
The Hymnan case left such a deed presumptively a conveyance
to the grantee individually, though this presumption might be destroyed by proof of a fiduciary relationship. 8 The present case holds
that such a deed can mean only one thing, and outside evidence
cannot change this.' Thus, the presumption in the Hyman case has
become conclusive.
D. C. H.
INSURANCE - RETENTION o PREMIUMS AFTER Loss
EXISTENCE OF PERSON QUALImED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT. -

-

NONP in-

surance company issued to A its national standard automobile
liability policy. A paid the premiums for one year, and four months
later died intestate. The policy terms permitted assignment, if
written notice were given within thirty days after the death of the
named insured, to cover (a) his legal representative, and (b) any
person having proper temporary custody of the automobile as insured until appointment and qualification of such legal representative, but in no event for a period of more than thirty days after
such death. Written notice of A's death was given but no legal
representative for A's estate was appointed for more than two
months after A's death. B received injuries while riding in A's
car more than two months after A's death and filed suit against
A's estate. Thereupon P paid the unearned balance of the premium
into court and brought this action for a declaratory judgment.
Held, that the delay and retention of the unearned balance of the
premium affected no waiver of the condition subsequent; therefore
the policy was terminated. New Century Casualty Co. v. Chase.'
If the insurer learns of a ground of forfeiture other than the
nonpayment of premiums before a loss occurs, it seems that it
must notify the insured within a reasonable time, under penalty
of being held to have waived its forfeiture rights,2 on the ground
8 SyL 1: 11A deed made to the 'Right Reverend P. J. Donahoe (sic], Bishop
of Wheeling", conveying to him land .. . vests in P. J. Dohahoe [sic individually the legal and equitable title thereto, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary." Accord: Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N. E. 246 (1893).
9 The unusually strict construction which the common law placed on sealed
instruments should not apply today in West Virginia where the seal has become unnecessary in the execution of a deed. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c.
36, art. 3, § 1.
1 39 F. Supp. 768 (S. D. W. Va. 1941).
2 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Dallavo, 274 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921)
(insurance company waived forfeiture where company had notice of breach of
condition long before the loss, but retained premiums and left policy outstanding) ; Southern States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kronenberg, 199 Ala. 164, 74 So. 63
(1917) (where fire company before loss is notified of forfeiture or breach of
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that it would be inequitable to allow the insurer, knowing that he
was not bound by the contract, to retain the premiums, lull the
insured into a false sense of security, and by his silence thus cause
him to refrain from obtaining other insurance. 3 If the insurer
knows of no grounds of forfeiture for breach of condition subsequent until after the loss occurs, mere silence will not be construed
as waiver, 4 unless peculiar circumstances impose on it a duty to
speak.5 Some courts refuse to adopt the rule that failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time is to be interpreted as a waiver;6
but such courts seize upon very slight circumstances as showing an
intent to waive the forfeiture, that is, to disaffirm the contract,
such as retention of the unearned portion of the premium7 even in
cases where it is doubtful whether the insurer is under any present
duty to return such unearned premium. According to Williston,
the minority view, that the unearned portion of the premium must
be returned in order to terminate the policy, rests on the notion
that a policy of insurance is like a lease and continues in force
until affirmative action is taken.9 Most authorities deny that there
is a duty on the insurer to take such affirmative action to find
insured and tender back the amount of the premium paid before
the insurer had knowledge of the breach of condition. 10
In the instant case it seems that the delay might well be deemed
not unreasonable, for the company took affirmative action two
condition by insured, it is the duty of the company to take some affirmative
action to notify insured that a forfeiture will be claimed, or a waiver may be
inferred); see Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lennon, 140 Ve. 766, 776,
125 S.E. 801 (1924).
sHartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 226 Ala. 430, 147 So. 628 (1933):
Farmers' & Mechanics' Benev. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Williams, 95 Va. 248, 28 S.
E. 214 (1897).
4 Union Assurance Soc. v. Reneer, 86 Ind. App. 240, 156 N. B. 833 (1927);
Bias v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 134, 101 S.E.247 (1919).
9 Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Dillon, 16 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927) (even if proofs of loss are defective, the insurer by retaining and
acting on, them without protest, waives defects therein); American Ins. Co. v.
Rector, 172 Ark. 767, 290 S.W. 367 (1927);) Rheims v. Standard Fire Ins.
Co. of Wheeling, 39 W. Va. 672, 20 S.E. 670 (1894).
6 Mullan v. Wisconsin Central Co., 46 Minn. 474, 49 N. W. 249 (1891);
Moller v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 54 Wash. 439, 103 Pac. 449 (1909).
7 Cf. Allen v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 14 Idaho 728, 95 Pac. 829 (1908);
Padrnos v. Century Fire Ins. Co., 142 Iowa 199, 119 N. W. 133 (1909);
Schreiber v. German-American Hail Ins. Co., 43 Minn. 367, 45 N. W. 708
(1890) (retention of unearned premium after notice of breach of condition
and before loss for an unreasonable time held a waiver).
8 Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 Atl. 397 (1925) ; Lane
v. Parsons, Rich & Co., 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W. 485 (1906).
9 3 "WmsoN,CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 758.
lo Dickerson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 Il.270, 65 N. E. 694
(1902); Norris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 55 S.C. 450, 33 S.E. 566 (1899);
3 WIL.STON CONTRACTS § 757.
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months after the insured's death; this would mean no waiver. Nor
did the insurer retain the unearned premium under such circumstances as to involve a waiver,1 since it would hardly have been
possible to return the unearned premium earlier because of the
tardy appointment of a legal representative to whom it could have
been paid. On either view the result appears a proper one.
H. P. S.
LANDLORD AND

TENANT -

PROIUSE BY LANDLORD. -

DUTY

To

REPAIR -

GRATUITOUS

P brought trespass on the case, against

D, for the alleged wrongful death of P's decedent. D owned a
two-family dwelling, one part of which he leased to P. A double
chimney, located between the respective parts of the house, had two
or more flues which were maintained for the joint and common use
of both family units. By reason of defects in the chimney and flue
the part of the dwelling leased by P caught fire, and P's decedent
perished in the fire. D, through his agent, had promised to inspect
and repair the flue, and had repaired the half of the chimney and
flue in the unit occupied by the other tenant. P relied for recovery
upon the "common use rule'4 and upon D's failure to carry out
his gratuitous promise to repair. The trial court sustained D's
demurrer to both counts of the petition. Affirmed. Redden V.
James T. McCreery Co., Inc.2
This case presents for the first time in West Virginia the problem of the liability of a lessor who has gratuitously promised to repair, when, due to his nonperformance, the tenant is injured." The
law seems well established that absent an agreement to the contrary
there is no duty upon the lessor to repair leased premises during
the continuance of the lease.4 In three situations, however, courts
ave recognized the liability of the landlord for injury caused by
failure to repair. First, a doctrine uniformly adopted by the courts
is the "common use rule" 5 which imposes a duty upon the landCCf. Goorberg v. West Assurance Co., 150 Cal. 510, 89 Pac. 130 (1907);
Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15, 84 AtI. 109 (1912)i (mere retention
of premiums after loss, where liability is steadfastly denied, does not constitute
a waiver of defense nor an estoppel.
'For a discussion of this rule see Commonwealth v. Bond, 214 Pa. 307, 63
At. 741 (1906).
2 15 S. E. (2d) 150 (W. Va. 1941).
a The issue was discussed but not decided in a recent Virginia case. Newman v. Early, 176 Va. 263, 10 S. E. (2d) 885 (1940).
4 Charlow v. Blankenship, 80 W. Va. 200, 92 S. E. 318 (1917); Arbenz v.
Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W. Va. 476, 44 S. E. 149 (1903).
5 HARPER, ToaTs (1933) §§ 103, 236.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1941

3

